International commitment to safe nuclear reactors | Science

In their Policy Forum “The weapons potential of high-assay low-enriched uranium” (7 June 2024, p. 1071), R. S. Kemp et al. describe the potential misuse of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU). The American Nuclear Society (ANS)—a professional nuclear science and technology society representing more than 10,000 members worldwide—acknowledges the importance of continually evaluating the proliferation risks associated with nuclear materials. However, we disagree with Kemp et al.’s implied recommendation that the United States decide international nuclear security policy by unilaterally redefining HALEU enriched above 10% as “weapons usable.” ANS’s position on HALEU aligns with the stance of the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): HALEU enriched up to 20% is not considered “direct-use” material (1). In their Policy Forum “The weapons potential of high-assay low-enriched uranium” (7 June 2024, p. 1071), R. S. Kemp et al. describe the potential misuse of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU). The American Nuclear Society (ANS)—a professional nuclear science and technology society representing more than 10,000 members worldwide—acknowledges the importance of continually evaluating the proliferation risks associated with nuclear materials. However, we disagree with Kemp et al.’s implied recommendation that the United States decide international nuclear security policy by unilaterally redefining HALEU enriched above 10% as “weapons usable.” ANS’s position on HALEU aligns with the stance of the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): HALEU enriched up to 20% is not considered “direct-use” material (1).  Science